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Venue Reform in Kentucky - A Proposal
By GEORGE NEFF STEVENS*
The Honorable Watson Clay in a recent article in the Ken-
tucky State Bar Journal indicated that an overall study of venue
in Kentucky was now in progress.' Because of my ties to Ken-
tucky and my interest in the subject of venue, I accepted this
opportunity to make some suggestions.
Trouble spots in the venue picture usually appear at the fol-
lowing points:
1. Jurisdiction and Venue;
2. Joinder of Causes of Action and Venue;
3. Service of Process, Jurisdiction over the Person and
Venue;
4. Joinder of Parties, Service of Process and Venue; and
5. Grounds of Venue
If these sore points can be soothed, much needless confusion,
costly delay and wasteful litigation can be eliminated.
Jurisdiction and Venue
The distinction between jurisdiction and venue is funda-
mental. Jurisdiction, m the sense of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, means the power of a court to hear and determine the
general abstract question involved, to inquire into facts, to apply
the law, to make decision and to declare judgment. In every
state in the United States there is a constitutional or statutory
provision conferring general original jurisdiction on some court,
either generally,2 or in the county in which the court is sitting.:
*A.B. Dartmouth College; M.A., Umversity of Lousville; LL.B., Cornell
Umversity. Dean and Professor of Law, Umversity of Buffalo School of Law,
Buffalo, New York. Member of Kentucky, Ohio, and Nev York Bars.
15 Ky. ST. BAn JouRN. 68 (1951).
ALA. CODE (1940) Tit. 13 § 126 and 129; CONST. OF Amz. Art. VI § 6;
AmE. STAT. Ann. (1947) § 2-301 and 22-404; CAL. CONST. of 1879 Art. VI § 5;
CONST. OF COLO. Art. VI § 11, GEN. STAT. OF CONN. (Rev. of 1949) § 7745; REV.
CODE OF DEL. (1935) § 4274; CONST. OF FLA. of 1885 Art. 5 § 11, CoNsT. OF GA.
of 1945 § 2-3901, IDAHO CODE (1949) § 1-705; CONST. OF ILL. Art VI § 12; IND.
STAT. ANN. (Bums 1946 Rep.) § 4-303; CODE OF IOWA (1946) § 604.1; GEN.
STAT. OF KAN. 1935) § 20-301, Ky. REV. STAT. (Baldwin s 1943 Rev.) § 23.010,
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Kentucky provides by K.R.S. Section 23.010 that the circuit court
shall have original jurisdiction of all matters, both in law and
equity, unless delegated exclusively to some other tribunal.
Venue on the other hand has nothing to do with the power
of the court to hear and determine a controversy Venue means
the place of trial, the particular county or territorial area, within
the state or district in which the cause is properly brought or
tried. It has to do with geographical subdivisions, relates to
practice or procedure, and may be waived. So also, every state
in the United States has constitutional or statutory provisions con-
trolling the venue of civil cases.' Judge Hobson in Gillen v
Illinos Central R. Co." said of the Kentucky venue provisions:
"The purpose of sections 62-77 of the Code is not
to regulate the jurisdiction of courts. The Code of Practice
does not treat of the jurisdiction of courts or.attempt to reg-
ulate it. It simply regulates the procedure m civil actions.
The purpose of these sections of the Code, as shown m the
title, is to regulate the county m which the action may be
brought; or, m other words, the venue of actions. If an
action under any of these sections for the recovery of money
within the jurisdiction of the court is not brought in the
proper county, it may be dismissed if the objection is prop-
erly taken; but, if the defendant does not object to the
venue, the matter is waived."
LA. CONST. of 1921 Art. 7 § 35; REv. STAT. OF ME. (1944) c. 94 § 5; ANN. LA-ws
OF MASS. (1933) Vol. 7 c. 212 §§ 3 and 4; MicIH. STAT. ANN. (1937) § 27.542;
Miss. CODE ANN. (1942) §§ 1262 and 1428; MONT. COEST. Art. VII § 11 and
REv. CODES OF MONT. (1935) § 8829; Riv. STAT. OF NEB. (1943) § 24-302; NEV.
CoIP LAws (1929) § 8382; REv. LAWS OF N.H. (1942) c. 370 § 6; N.J. CoNST.
of 1947 Art. 6 § 3 par. 2; CONST. OF N.M. (1911) Art. 6 § 13; N.Y. CONST. Art.
6 § 1, GEN. STAT. OF N.C. (1943) § 7-63; R,. CODE OF N.D. (1943) § 27-0506;
Omo GEN. CODE (Page 1938, or Throckanorton 1948) § 11215; OKLA. CONST.
ART. VII § 10; ORE. CONST. ART. VII 9; GEN. LAws OF R.I. (1988) c. 496 §§ 6
and 7 CONST. OF S.C. of 1895 Art. 5 15; S.D. CODE (1939) § 32.0904; TENN.
CODE ANN. (Williams 1934) § 10318; ANN. TEx. STAT. (Vernon 1926) Tit. 40
Art. 1906; REv. STAT. OF UTAH (1933) § 20-3-4; VT. STAT. (1947 Rev.) §§ 1277
and 1400; VA. CODE (1942) § 5890; REv. STAT. OF WASH. (Remngton 1932)
§ 15; W VA. CODE (1943) § 5196; VIs. STAT. (1947) § 252.03; Wyo. CONST.
Art. 5 § 10.
'ANN. CODE OF MD. (Flack 1939) Art. 16 § 93, and Art. 26 § 41, M, . STAT.
ANN. (1945) § 484.01; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1942) § 2100; 17 PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon 1930) 251.
Paige v. Sinclair, 237 Mass. 482, 130 N.E. 177 (1921); but see Shadoin v.
Sellars, 223 Ky. 751, 4 S.W 2d. 717 (1928).
For a collection and study of these statutes see Stevens, Venue Statutes;
Diagnoi s and Proposed Cure, 49 MicH. L. REv. 307 (1951).
137 Kv. W75, 125 S.W 1047 (1910).
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Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals has not seen fit to follow
this sound lead. The annotations to practically every venue pro-
vision in the Kentucky Code list cases wherein venue is spoken of
and treated as a limitation on the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter of the particular action.7 Once this possibility
of jurisdictional limitation through venue is recognized, the
lawyer who fails to object to improper venue in a timely manner
will raise the objection that the court has no jurisdiction. This
seems to be the case in Kentucky 8
The confusion in the Kentucky cases as in other states stems
from a misapplication of the common law concept of local actions,
triable only at the place where the land lies. For example, in
Livingston v Jefferson,9 Chief Justice Marshall held that
trespass to land was a local action and could be brought
only in the courts of the state where the land lies. This type of
decision is an example of a geographical limitation on jurisdiction.
Here the land upon which the trespass was committed was in an-
other state. This rule does not apply, and should not be applied,
to land located within the state. There is no question but that the
people of the Commonwealth of Kentucky have the right and the
power to give their courts jurisdiction over all the land anvwhere
in Kentucky This they did in K.R.S. Section 23.010. Kentucky
Code Section 62, which reads, in part, that actions for injury to
real property must be brought in the county in which the subject
of action, or some part thereof, is situated is simply a venue pro-
vision. It designates the county in which the action should be
brought for purposes of trial convenience. Here there is no ques-
tion of power, or of control. There is only a question of con-
venience and of distribution of the work of the Circuit Court.
There is little doubt but that the use of the word "must" was
and is in part responsible for the position the Court of Appeals
'See for example. Commonwealth v. Morrell Refrigerator Car Co., 129 Ky.
738, 112 S.W 860 (1908) (action to recover a fine); Darnel v. New Era Land Co.,
137 Ky. 535, 126 S.W 108 (1910) (action against a public officer); Day v.
Knuckles. 297 Ky. 157, 179 S.W 2d. 220 (1944) (suit for value of timber cut
from land in dispute); Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Conklin, 303 Ky. 87, 196
S.W 2d 961 (1946) (tort action against carrier); Richardson v. Hays, 303 Kv.
674, 198 S.W 2d 976 (1947) (lien note on land): Noel v. Noel, 307 Ky. 122,
210 S.W., 2d. 137 (1947) (Divorce, involving land distribution); and Richfield
Coal Co. v. Bennett, 310 Ky. 552, 221 S.W 2d. 91 (1949).
8 See for example, Black v. Bishop, 307 Ky 40, 209 SAV 2d. 482 (1948).
"'1 Brock. 203 (Fed. 1811).
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has so frequently taken. 0 The legislative intent was, probably,
that these words were not intended to be ]urisdictional limitations,
but were used only to make it clear that failure to comply sub-
jects the pleader to attack on the ground that the venue is im-
properly laid. But, since the Kentucky provision is not unam-
biguous, and since a law suit may be won by having the action
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, litigation becomes a certainty
Another factor in the Kentucky picture is that there is no
provision in the Code dealing expressly with the problem of how
and when to attack venue improperly laid." Consequently, it is
not surprising to find lawyers attacking improper venue by motion
to quash or demurrer on the ground that the court has no juris-
diction. '-
All these difficulties can be eliminated by carefully planned
and worded legislation. A suggestion as to how to deal with these
problems is included in the proposed Code set forth at the end
of this paper.
Jozider of Causes of Action and Venue
joinder of causes of action becomes a venue problem when the
plaintiff's attorney wants to join in a single law suit two or more
claims against the same defendant, which claims, if brought sep-
aratelv would have to be brought in different counties. Kentucky
is one of the tventy-three states which have statutes dealing with
the problem. :' Section 83 of the Kentucky Code limits joinder of
causes of action, other~vise joinable, by providing for joinder only
if each may be brought in the same county Section 86 provides
for waiver of objection to misjomder unless taken in a timely
manner under Section 85. The Court of Appeals has not, so far
as can be ascertained, construed the venue aspect of these par-
ticular provisions. If the present review of the Civil Code in-
dicates a need for broader joinder of causes of action in the
interest of settling claims between the same parties in a single
law suit, then care must be taken to review the limiting effect
of the present provision with respect to venue.
"' See cases cited, supra fni. 7. Also, see detailed study of this and similar con-
fusing language m Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnoss and Proposed Cure, 49
Micu. L. REV. 307 at 320 (1951).
" Kentucky is not alone. Only twenty-one states have statutes dealing with
this problem. See 49 MICH. L. Rlv. 307 at 321-323.
"Supra fn. 8.
" See, Stevens, 49 MICH. L. REv. 307 at 324-325.
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If the present rule is retained, the statute should provide, not
for dismissal of the improperly joined causes of action, but for
dividing the suit into as many actions as necessary and transfer-
ring them to a proper county for further proceedings. This change
would do much to cut costs and speed up decisions on the merits.
A specific suggestion will be found in the proposed act later to be
discussed.
Service of Process, Jurisdiction over the Person and Venue
Service of process becomes a complicating factor in the venue
picture whenever a statute or statutes tie service requirements to
venue provisions. The importance of proper service needs no
citation of authority The difficulty of obtaining service in many
instances is also well known to the practicing lawyer. Any statute
that needlessly adds to the difficulty or complicates the obtaining
of a proper service should be eliminated. Unfortunately, Ken-
tucky is one of the twenty states in which service of process and
venue are tied together." If Section 41 of the Kentucky Code,
providing that a summons shall be issued at any time, to any
county, against any defendant, at the plaintiff's request, were the
sole service provision, Kentucky would join the twenty-eight
states which provide that service may be had in any and all civil
actions anywhere in the state. However, Section 41 is limited by
Sections 70 (Upon retun of "no property found") and 78 (Tran-
sitory actions) when venue is laid at the place where the de-
fendant is summoned. When this ground is the theory of venue,
service, for proper venue, can be had only in the county where
action is brought. The problem presented by this type of venue
provision should be eliminated by abolishing venue based upon
service of summons. This matter will be more fully discussed
under "Grounds of Venue"
Sec. 41 is also, and far more seriously, limited by Sec. 78
whether venue be based on service of summons or on residence of
the defendant by virtue of Sec. 79. Tis latter section provides,
in effect, that where venue is based on summons, the service of
process does not give jurisdiction over the person of defendant
unless service was made in the county where venue is laid. Like-
' See, Stevens, 49 MICH. L. REv. 807 at 325-827.
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vise, the statute says that where venue is based on defendant's
residence, service is invalid, although otherwise properly bad,
unless defendant resides in the county where the action is
brought. Thus, Sec. 79 turns a simple problem of improper venue
iito a serious question of jurisdiction over the person.
This method of raising the issue of improper venue is con-
fusing, time consuming, and a hindrance to the speedy adminis-
tration of justice. It gives no protection to a defendant that can-
not be given as expeditiously by motion attack for improper
venue. It complicates the problem of service on the defendant,
and it results in unnecessary delay in reaching a binding decision
on the merits. Consequently, it is recommended that Sec. 79 of
the Kentucky Civil Code be repealed. In the proposed Venue
Code the suggested method of treatment will show that there is
also no need for Sections 81 and 82 of the present Code.
Joinder of Parties, Service of Process and Venue
joinder of parties becomes a venue problem when the venue
of plaintiff's action is based upon the county where one of several
defendants resides or is summoned and the other defendant or
defendants do not reside in, or cannot be served in, the same
county Kentucky is one of the forty-one states which have venue
statutes by virtue of which venue may be laid in the county where
any one of several defendants resides or is summoned.' 5 Civil
Code Sec. 7'3, concerning actions against common carriers, and
Sec. 78, covering transitory actions, so provide.
Service of process, however, is a complicating factor m Ken-
tuckv because Sec. 41 of the Code is limited by Sec. 80. Here
again the statute has changed the simple problem of improper
venue into the serious question of jurisdiction over the person. It
does even more. It makes the question of proper venue, and of
proper service turn not only on whether the defendants are
properly joined"' but also and far more important on what the out-
come of the case against the resident or served defendant may
be.'
7
See, Stevens, 49 MicH. L. REv. 307 at 327-331.
Ky. CODE See. 78 - "who may be properly joined as such m the action"
Ky. CODE Sec. 80 - Several defendants; judgment; bankrupt. "In an action
brought pursuant to section 78, against several defendants, no judgment shall be
rendered against any of them, upon the service of a summons out of the county
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There is a reason for such legislation at this point. Venue
based on residence or service on one of several defendants has
been abused by the device of adding a party defendant for the
sole purpose of controlling venue. Kentucky is one of six states's
which have attempted to deal with the problem by legislation.
From the point of view of the honest plaintiff who with prob-
able cause and in good faith joined the defendant upon whose
residence or service venue is based the statute can be very un-
fair. Sec. 80 recognizes this in part by providing for waiver where
the defendant summoned outside the county makes defense with-
out objecting to the jurisdiction of the court. As a practical mat-
ter, however, this effort at amelioration fails, for lawyers for such
defendants will make objection on this point in every such case
as a matter of course."O
Admitting that the Kentucky experiment is a great improve-
ment over the common law situation, still a valid criticism lies in
the wastefulness of a procedure which allows a full hearing on the
merits resulting m a verdict for the plaintiff against one or more
of the defendants, only to be set aside because the defendant
upon whose residence or service venue was based escapes lia-
bility 2o The issue should be one of good faith in laying the venue.
The time to raise and decide this issue should be at the outset of
the action, not at its conclusion. A suggestion along these lines
is included in the proposed Code set forth at the end of this paper.
Grounds of Venue
In a recent study of Venue on a national basis"' I discovered
that contemporary venue provisions are predicated on some thir-
teen different fact situations. These grounds of Venue are (1)
in which the action is brought, if no one of them be summoned in that county,
nor resided therein when the action was commenced; nor if the action be discon-
tinued or disrmssed as to the defendant who resided, or was summoned, m that
county; nor if judgment be rendered in Ins favor, unless a defendant summoned
out of that county make defense without objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court: I
" Ark., Ill., Iowa, Ky., Minn. and S. Dak.
The problem as to what constitutes a proper objection under Sec. 80 may
yet prove very troublesome. The Ohio Supreme Court held in Bucurenciu v.
Ramba, 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N.E. 565 (1927), that a general denial raised the
objection]
' See for example, University of Lomsville v. Metcalf, 216 Ky. 339, 287 S.W
945 (1926). For a collection of such cases, see 93 A.L.R. 949 (1934).
1 Stevens, Venue Statutes: Diagnosis and Proposed Cure, 49 MIcH. L. Rv.
307 at 307-316, 340-362 (1951).
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Where the subject of action or part thereof is situated, (2) Where
the cause of action, or part thereof, arose or accrued, (3) Where
some fact is present or happened, (4) Where the defendant re-
sides, (5) Where the defendant is doing business, (6) Where the
defendant has an office or place of business, or an agent, or repre-
sentative, or where an agent or officer of defendant resides, (7)
Where the plaintiff resides, (8) Where the plaintiff is doing busi-
ness, (9) Where the defendant may be found, (10) Where the
defendant may be summoned or served, (11) In the county desig-
nated in the plaintiff's complaint, (12) In any county, and (13)
Where the seat of government is located.
Venue statutes should have some sound basis for their adop-
tion. Each provision should be based on convenience of the court,
of the defendant, of the plaintiff, or of the witnesses. Tested by
such a requirement only five of the above grounds measure up to
standard. These five sound grounds are (1) Where the subject of
action or part thereof is situated, (2) Where the cause of action,
or part thereof, arose or accrued, (3) Where the defendant re-
sides, (4) Where the plaintiff resides, and (5) Where the seat of
government is located.
Venue based upon (1) Where the defendant is doing business
and (2) Where the defendant has an office, etc., qualify in part
but might better be absorbed, by careful legislative draftsman-
ship, into one of the five sound grounds.
Six of the thin-teen grounds fail to qualify in any respect. These
are (1) Where some fact is present or happened, (2) Where the
plaintiff is doing business, (3) Where the defendant may be
found, (4) Where the defendant may be summoned or served,
(5) In the county designated in the plaintiff's complaint and (6)
In any county Venue based on these six grounds should be
abolished. They add needless confusion, create unnecessary prob-
lems, and do not contribute to the speedy and impartial admmis-
tration of justice. - -
Present Kentucky venue provisions employ eight of the tlr-
teen grounds above listed. These include the five sound
grounds, -3 one of the grounds that could be absorbed in the five
' For a detailed discussion, see Stevens, fn. 21 supra.
' (1) Where the subject of action or part thereof is situated: Ky. CODE §§:
62, 70, and 75; (2) Where the cause of action, or part thereof, arose or accrued:
Ky. CODE §§: a3, 71, 72, 73, 74, and 77. (3) Where the defendant resides: Ky.
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sound grounds24 and two of the grounds which should be abol-
ished.25
It is quite obvious that the present Kentucky Civil Code with
respect to Venue was developed with an eye to particular types of
cases, as for example, Sec. 62 covering real property; See. 63, fines
and forfeitures; Sec. 64, wills; on through to Sec. 78, which covers
transitory actions, and, to particular parties, such as, prisoners,
Sec. 69; banks and insurance companies, Sec. 71, corporations,
Sec. 72; and common carners, Sec. 73.
Such an approach leads to a multitude of venue provisions,
complicates the ]ob of the lawyer in choosing the proper venue
and increases the possibility of delaying tactics because of the in-
creased possibility of improper or questionable venue.
It is suggested that Kentucky s new Venue Code be broad and
general in approach and coverage, rather than narrow and re-
stricted. Detailed regulation of specific parties or types of action
should be avoided in so far as possible. And the number of
grounds of venue should be reduced to a minimum, thus elim-
inating unnecessary distinctions which all too frequently give rise
to confusion and litigation.
With all the above factors in mind, the following Code is sug-
gested as one of many possible solutions.
Proposed Venue Code for Kentucky
Chapter 1. Venue- Place of Trial
Section 1. Venue.- Place of Trial: The following provisions
relate to venue - the place of trial - of civil actions within the
state. They are not, and are not to be construed to be, jurisdic-
tional provisions or limitations under any circumstances whatso-
ever.
Comment: It is suggested that this provision will clarify the
legislative intent and render obsolete all Kentucky cases where-
in venue is spoken of as a jurisdictional limitation in any respect.
CODE §: 69, 70, 78, 74, 75, and 78. (4) Where the plaintiff resides: Ky. CODE §§:
78 and 7.4. (5) Where the seat of government is located: Ky. CODE Sec. 69.
Where the defendant has an office or place of business, or an agent, or repre-
sentative, or where an agent or officer of defendant resides: Ky. CODE See. 71
and 72.
' (1) Where some fact is present or happened: Ky. CODE §§: 64, 65, 66, 67,
70, 78, 75, and 76. (2) Where the defendant may be summoned or served: KY.
CODE §§ 70, and 78.
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(1) The county in which the subject of action, or part thereof,
is situated is the proper county for the trial of the following
actions:
(a) For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or
interests thereto, or for the determination in any form of
such right or interest;
(b) For the partition or sale of real property;
(c) For the foreclosure of all liens and mortgages on real
property; and
(d) For the recovery of specific personal property
Comment: This provision reenacts See. 62 (1), (2) and (3). It
adds a provision, not presently found in Kentucky, covering
replevin actions. It is suggested that this group be included be-
cause of expedience in seizure of a chattel at the outset of the
suit by the sheriff of the county in which the action is brought.
Note that later provisions give the plaintiff an option to lay the
venue elsewhere in this type of case if the facts fit. Sec. 62 (4)
coverng injury to real property has not been included. Trespass
to land actions should not be treated specifically, but should be
covered by general provisions. See comments under later
sections.
(2) The county m which the act complained of, or part
thereof, occurred, or in which the act, or part thereof, which
was omitted, should have been performed, or in which the loss
resulted from such omission, is a proper county for trial, except
for actions listed under subsection (1) (a), (b) and (c)
Comment: It is suggested that this type of provision be used
rather than the terminology "where the cause of action or part
thereof arose or accrued." There is still considerable difficulty
with the term "cause of action." Add to this the "or part thereof'
provision and the difference between "arose" and "accrued"26
and a difficult problem of interpretation is presented. It is sug-
gested that the above provision would provide a venue at the
place vhere witnesses are most likely to be available and. where
a view if helpful, could be had, without encountering the dif-
ficulties of interpreting venue based upon "where the cause of
action or part thereof arose or accrued." This provision pro-
vides the same coverage in a broader and more general form
that is now found in See. 63 (fine or forfeiture to recover; officer
against), Sec. 71 (bank or insurance company), Sec. 72 (cor-
See for example, State ex rel. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
The Circuit Court, 165 Wis. 387, 162 N.W 436 (1917).
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porations generally upon a contract or for a tort), Sec. 73 (com-
mon earner; upon a contract to carry property or for a tort),
See. 74 (person or character, injury to), and Sec. 77 (contractor
for public work). One provision, made applicable to all, re-
places six provisions each aimed at separate groups or causesl
Note that trespass to land would fall into this category, and,
under it, a proper venue, among others, would be the county in
which the land was located - thus, Sec. 62 (4) is reenacted, but
as a general, rather than specific, provision.
(3) The county in which the defendant, or defendants, or
any one of them reside at the commencement of the action is
a proper county for trial except for actions listed under sub-
section (1) (a), (b) and (c) For purposes of this sub-
division.
(a) Persons - residence as used in this section means a
dwelling place or dwelling places within the state. It does
not include transient or temporary lodging. A prisoner in
this State, or a person confined in an asylum for persons of
unsound mind in this State is to be considered a resident
of the county in which he resided or claimed residence
when confined if known, and if not known, of the county
where he is confined.
(b) Corporations - both domestic and foreign corpora-
tions shall be deemed to be residents of any county in
which the corporation (1) has an office, (2) has a place
of business, or (3) is actually doing business;
(c) Nonresidents doing business in the state - partner-
ships composed of residents, nonresidents, or both doing
business in the state, unincorporated associations com-
posed of residents, non-residents or both, doing business in
the state, and non-residents doing business in the state
through agents in the state, shall be deemed to be resi-
dents of the county in which they are actually doing
business.
Comment: By the use of the article "a" rather than "the" m
subsections (2) and (3), it is intended to make it clear that the
plaintiff has an option as to the place of venue where his facts
fit either provision. This terminology is employed throughout
this Code. The purpose of subsection (8) (a) is to define resi-
dence. It makes it clear that a person may possibly have two
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places of residence.27 The provision with respect to prisoners
and persons confined to asylums reenacts Sec. 69 of the Code as
a part of this general provision. Subsection (3) (b) eliminates
the need for venue based upon "where defendant has an office,
etc." This provision incorporates into a general defendant's res-
idence venue provision the specific provisions of See. 71 (banks
and insurance companies) and See. 72 (corporations generally
upon a contract or for a tort). It would eliminate the problem
as to the proper venue of an action against a common carrier
which was also a corporation (Sec. 72 or See. 73), as well as the
question as to what is the residence of a common carrier raised
in James v Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry.2- This provision changes
and broadens the rule therein laid down with respect to resi-
dence of a corporation. Subsection (3) (c) eliminates the need
for venue based upon "where the defendant is doing business,
etc." and yet provides a place of trial for cases involving parties
of this description. ,Do not confuse this provision which relates
to venue with the more difficult problem of how to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of such parties. The object of sub-
section (3) (c) is simply to provide a place of trial in those
cases where jurisdiction over the person can be successfully ob-
tamed by some proper service or where the case may be trans-
formed into a quasi in rent proceeding by attachment and some
form of constructive service. Note that trespass to land cases
fall within this provision where the facts fit. Subsection 3 re-
enacts in a broader form See. 70 (Upon return of "no property
found"), See. 73 (Common carrier), See. 74 (Person or char-
acter), See. 75 (Constructive service) and See. 78 (Transitory
actions).
(4) The county in which the plaintiff or plaintiffs, or any of
them reside at the commencement of the action is a proper
county for trial when all of the defendants are nonresidents
except for actions listed under subsection (1) (a), (b) and
(c) For purposes of tis subdivision:
(a) Persons - residence as used in this section means a
dwelling place or dwelling places within the state. It does
not include transient or temporary lodging;
(b) Corporations - both domestic and foreign corpora-
tions shall be deemed to be residents of any county in
'This provision is in line with the position taken as to what constitutes resi-
dence for venue purposes m Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Conklin, 303 Ky. 87
196 S.W 2d. 961 (1946).
'310 Ky. 616, 221 S.W 2d. 449 (1949).
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which the corporation (1) has an office, (2) has a place of
business, or (8) is actually doing business;
(c) Nonresidents doing business in the state - partner-
ships composed of residents, nonresidents, or both doing
business in the state, unincorporated associations com-
posed of residents, nonresidents, or both doing business wn
the state, and nonresidents doing business in the state
through agents in the state shall be deemed to be residents
of the county in which they are actually doing business.
Comment: In many states the plaintiff may elect to bring his
action in the county where either a defendant or a plaintiff
resides. Since the plaintiff controls the bringing of a lawsuit,
it is suggested that this provision, which is highly favorable 'o
the plaintiff, be limited, as it is, to situations not covered by sub-
sections (1) and (8) above. It will give a plaintiff an election
as to venue if the facts fit subsection (2) above. Its main pur-
pose is to provide a place of trial within the state, based on
convenience of the plaintiff, where a foreign cause of action is
involved. This provision does not cover the possibility of venue
at plaintiff's residence presently permitted by Sec. 78 (action
against a common carrier, in county in which plaintiff resides,
if he resides in a county into which the carrier passes) or bv
Sec. 74 (actions for libel, in the county in which the plaintiff
resides) It is hoped that these parts of Sections 78 and 74 will
be repealed. They are not necessary today regardless of -the
situation at the time of their enactment.
Note that Subsection 4 covers an action for trespass to land
where the facts fit. For example, land in one county in Ken-
tuckv plaintiff a resident of another county in Kentucky, the
trespasser, a nonresident of Kentucky Here, plaintiff would
have an election to lay venue in the county where the trespass
took place under Subsection 2 (and, of course, but incidentally,
where the land lies) or in the county where he, the plaintiff,
resides under this subsection.
Do not confuse this possibility re venue with the problem of
how to get service on the nonresident defendant. This provision
covers a proper place for trial. It is not concerned with how to
get a proper service. The two are separate. Keep them so!
(5) The county in which the seat of government is located
is the proper county for the trial of the following actions:
(a) Where all of the parties to the action are nonresidents
and the venue cannot be laid under subsection (1) (a)
(b), (c), (d), or (2) hereof;
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(b) Where the action is against the state or any agency
thereof;
(c) Where the action is against a county, city or other po-
litical subdivision.
For the purposes of this subdivision: In an action under sub-
sections (a) or (b), seat of government means the county in
which the state government is located; in an action under (c),
seat of government means the defendant county or the county in
which the appropriate political subdivision is located.
Comment: The question whether or not states must open their
courts to actions by nonresidents against nonresidents on foreign
causes of action is not within the scope of this study It is the
purpose of this subdivision to provide a venue m the states
which allow such actions and to do so in a county where, with
a mnmium of effort, some check can be made on the number
and types of suits of this nature which are being litigated. This
provision broadens and includes the coverage of See. 68 (Sink-
ing Fund Commissioners or Board of Education.)
(6) For the purposes of Section 1.
(a) The words "is a proper county" means that plaintiff
has an election to use such provision if his facts fit and
there is no exception.
(b) The words "is the proper county" means that plaintiff
has no election unless his facts fit into one of the other pro-
visions and there is no exception.
Comment: For example, the plaintiff may have an election in a
replevm action to lay his venue under subsection (1) (d), or
(2), or (3) or (4). The trespass to land possibilities have al-
ready been noted.
Section 2. Venue improperly laid, objection, waiver -- An
action brought in the wrong county may nevertheless be tried
therem, unless a defendant before the time for answer has ex-
pired, or at the time he makes his general appearance in the
case by answer, demurrer or otherwise, whichever comes first,
moves for its change to a proper county If such a motion is made
in a timely manner, the court shall order the change at plaintiff's
cost, which may include reasonable compensation for defendant's
trouble and expense, including attorneys fees, in attending in the
rv'ong county, and shall direct the clerk to forward all papers to
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the clerk of the court in the proper county for further proceedings.
If such a motion is not made within this time limit, the venue ir-
regularity shall be deemed to have been waived.
Comment: The purpose of this provision is to implement the
suggestions previously made.
Section 3. Change of venue by stipulation or consent.- All
the parties to an action, after it is commenced in any county may
agree by stipulation or by consent in open court, entered on the
record, that the place of trial may be changed to any other county
in the state. Thereupon, the court must order the change as
agreed upon.
Comment: K.R.S. Sec. 452.010 (1), as interpreted by the Court
of Appeals, allows such a change only when the venue is prop-
erly laid in the first mstance.2 9 Such a limitation, based on a
confusion of jurisdiction and venue, should be eliminated. The
above proposal broadens the old statute and makes clear the
legislative intent.
Section 4. Change of venue by contract, effect of - All con-
tracts, agreements or stipulations, made before an action is com-
menced, whereby the venue herein prescribed is altered, changed,
waived or otherwise affected, are valid, subject however to the
power of the court, on motion made under Section 2 above to
order the cause removed to a proper county if the court is of the
opinion that convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice
would be promoted by the change. Where an action is brought
in a proper county under this Code, despite a contract, agreement
or stipulation providing for venue in a different county, the de-
fendant may by motion under Section 2 above request the court
to order the cause removed to the county agreed upon. If the
court is of the opinion that convenience of witnesses and the ends
of justice would be promoted by the change, the judge should
order the case removed to the county agreed upon, otherwise not.
The decision of the court on either type of motion shall not be
subject to review
Comment: Section 4 is a liberalization of choice of venue
granted to contracting parties. The danger to be guarded
against in such agreements as to venue is economic duress or
'Burchfield v. Asher, 222 Ky. 108, 300 S.W 331 (1927), and Shadomn v.
Sellers, 223 Ky 751, 4 S.W 2d. 717 (1928).
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fraud. Do not confuse contracts limiting or changing venue
with contractual attempts to limit the jurisdiction of courts over
subject matter which are void for reasons of public policy
Section 5. Joznder of causes of action, proper venue.- Where
causes of action requiring different places of trial are joined
whether properly or not, the venue may be laid in any county
in which either cause of action, if sued upon separately, could
have been brought. Where the trial of these actions together
would be inexpedient, the defendant, before the time for answer
has expired, or at the time he makes his general appearance in
the case by answer, demurrer or otherwise, whichever comes first,
may move the court to separate the causes of action so joined and
to remove the cause or causes of action joined to a proper county
for further proceedings. If the causes of action so joined were im-
properly joined, and require different places of trial, the court
must, on timely motion, order the cause or causes of action so
joined removed to a proper county for further proceedings, at
plaintiff's cost. If the causes of action were properly joined, but
require different places of trial, the court may in its discretion
order the separation requested. If such a motion is not made
within the above time limit, any objection on any of these grounds
shall be deemed to be waived. If none of the causes of action so
joined could be brought in the county where the venue was laid,
the provisions of Section 2 shall control.
Comment: This provision implements the suggestions made
under the heading "Joinder of Causes of Action and Venue."
Section 6. Joznder of parties, proper venue.- When two or,
more defendants are joined and venue is laid at the residence of
one of them, the other or any of the other defendants, before the
time for answer has expired, or at the time he makes his general
appearance in the case by answer, demurrer or otherwise, which-
ever comes first, may make a motion for change of venue to a
proper county on the ground that the joinder of the resident de-
fendant was not made in good faith, but was made solely to con-
trol the venue of the action. Affidavits in support of the motion
setting forth the facts upon which the moving party relies must
be submitted when the motion is made. Plaintiff may submit
affidavits in answer thereto within three days after notice of
motion is served upon him or his attorney If the objection is
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properly taken in a timely manner and if the court is of the
opinion, on the basis of the affidavits submitted and after argu-
ment, that the resident defendant was joined merely to control
venue, the court must order the case removed at plaintiff's cost,
which may include reasonable compensation for defendant's
trouble and expense, including attorney s fees, in attending in
the wrong county, to a proper county for further proceedings. If
the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff joined the resident
defendant in good faith, the motion should be denied. The de-
cision of the court on a motion on this ground shall not be subject
to review unless there is a flagrant violation of discretion. Unless
the defendant objects on this ground in the manner herein pro-
vided and within the time limit set forth, he will be deemed to
have waived the objection.
Comment: This provision is in line with and implements the
suggestions made under the heading "Joinder of Parties, Service
of Process and Venue" It is submitted that this provision gives
a defendant all the protection he needs and at the same time
protects the plaintiff who has joined defendants in good faith
against an adverse decision on the merits against some but not
all of such defendants. This provision would supersede Sec. 80
of the present Code.
Comment: This provision covers, in a broader form, the pro-
vision of K.R.S. Sec. 452.010 (2).
Section 7 Change of venue properly laud.- The venue of
any civil action may be changed by order of the court on motion
by the party aggrieved when an impartial trial cannot be had in
the county wherein the action is pending. The right to make
such a motion shall be deemed to be waived if not taken before
trial.
Section 8. Number of changes of venue restricted.- Neither
party is entitled to more than one change of venue for any reason.
Comment: The purpose of this provision is to prevent abuse of
motions for change of venue by either plaintiff or defendant.
A tendency to use this device for purposes of delay is appearing.
It should be squelched.
Section 9. Transfer of judgments in actions affecting real
property.- When an action or proceeding affecting the title to or
possession of real estate has been brought in or transferred to a
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court of a county other than the county m which the real estate,
or some portion of it, is situated, the clerk of such court must,
after final judgment therein, certify, under his seal of office, and
transmit to the corresponding court of the county in which the
real estate affected by the action is situated, a copy of the judg-
ment. The clerk receiving such copy must file, and record the
judgment in the records of the court, briefly designating it as a
judgment transferred from court (naming the proper
court)
Section 10. Appeals.- An appeal may be taken from an order
granting or refusing to grant a motion to change the place of trial
of an action or proceeding unless the right to appeal is speci-
fically denied. Where the decision to grant a motion lies within
the discretion of the court, an appeal may be taken only when
there has been a flagrant abuse of this discretion. Notice of ap-
peal in either instance must be filed within two days after the
order granting or refusing to grant the motion is entered. Unless
so filed, any objection to such ruling is forever waived. If a notice
of appeal is properly filed, further proceedings in the case shall
be stayed pending decision on the appeal.
Comment: The purpose of this provision is to provide for an
immediate appeal on venue technicalities. This section must
be implemented, if it is to be effective, by a provision under
which the appellate court will hear such cases within ten days.
It is felt that the present practice under which objections to
venue go to appeal, after a decision of the case on the merits,
is extremely wasteful and must be eliminated.
Section 11. Improper venue, not jurisdictional.- No order,
judgment or decree shall be deemed void or voidable for want
of jurisdiction because rendered in the wrong venue.
Comment: The object of this section is to implement the
material discussed in Part II hereof under the heading "Juris-
diction and Venue"
Some Final Suggestions
This proposed Code will not be effective, and in fact will give
considerable trouble, unless Kentucky Civil Code Sections 79, 80,
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81 and 82, limiting service of process under Section 41, are re-
pealed, for the reasons discussed under "Service of Process, Juris-
diction over the Person, and Venue" It might be wise to
strengthen the language of Section 41 to read as follows:
"A summons shall be issued at any time to any county
against any defendant, at the plaintiff's request, regardless
of the kind of action or the propriety of venue."
The following provisions of the Kentucky Civil Code should
be repealed. Sections 62 through and including 82. It should be
noted that no special provision has been made m this proposal
for venue in actions concerning Wills, Sec. 64 of the present Code;
deceased persons or assigned estates, Sec. 65; distribution, par-
tition and sale of decedent's estate, Sec. 66; ward against guar-
dian, Sec. 67, upon return of "no property found", Sec. 70; per-
sons constructively summoned, See. 75; and alimony or divorce,
See. 76. The Wills provision, Sec. 64, does not tell the lawyer
where to lay venue. He must find out where the will should be
recorded before he knows. If Sec. 64 were repealed, under the
proposed Code Sec. 1 (2) would provide a proper venue based on
the omission to probate or the act of probating m the county
where, by law, the will should be probated, or was probated.
Sections 65, 66, and 67 provide a venue based upon where the
personal representative qualified. If repealed, as it is suggested
they should be, the proper venue of similar actions would be much
broader, allowing a greater choice, based upon trial convemence,
rather than the fact of the place of appointment. Frequently,
the venue would be the same county as under the present pro-
vision, but for firmfer reasons. The same is true of Sec. 70, upon
return of "no property found" and Sec. 75, persons constructively
served. With respect to divorce, Sec. 76, it is felt that no special
provision is required. The matter should be controlled by general
provisions.
The following provisions of the K.R.S. should be repealed:
K.R.S. Sec. 452.010 thru and including Sec. 452.100 (covering
change of Venue), and K.R.S. Sec. 23.020 (Franklin Circuit
Court venue in revenue and fiscal cases) The provisions of the
latter statute are embodied in the present Code. Consequently,
this special provision is unnecessary
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Also, all other provisions whether in the Statutes or the Civil
Code bearing on Venue in the Circuit Court should be repealed.
Venue can be simplified and the uncertainties of venue irregu-
larities can be eliminated. It is hoped that these suggestions will
be of some assistance in accomplishing these ends in Kentucky
